PHILOSOPHY NOTES Part 4 Ethical Theory and the Limits of Philosophy

 

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Philosophy Notes  Part 4                

This is the fourth post in the Philosophy Notes series. Each post is a supplement to my philosophy study guides, a series of 8 books designed to help philosophy students read, understand, and think critically about the classics of philosophy.   

Ethical Theory and the Limits of Philosophy

Immanuel Kant

In Part 3, I used the debate about the existence of God to show what I mean by the limits of philosophy. Philosophers are restricted to conceptual analysis. Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, and a few other philosophers understood that the only path to certainty in their quest to prove the existence of God is through an analysis of the concepts of God and Existence.

Proponents of analogical arguments from design for the existence of God cannot ignore conceptual analysis. After all, they must understand what they are looking for.  But once they have clarified the key concepts used in their question, e.g. “Does God exist?” they go outside the concepts and introduce empirical facts in an attempt to solve what they take to be an inductive question.  They are not restricted by certainty.  Their path is not certainty but probability (hopefully strong probability) for their conclusions.

John Stuart Mill

But enough of natural religion. In Part 1 of Philosophy Notes, I quoted a textbook definition of philosophy:  ‘Philosophy is the critical reflection on the justification of basic human beliefs and analysis of basic concepts in terms of which such beliefs are expressed.’ One of the most vexing basic human beliefs that philosophers have attempted to justify over the past two thousand years is the belief that there is an objective set of moral rules for evaluating human behavior, no matter the time, place, or culture of the humans being evaluated, whether they lived in the 8^th century B.C.E. or the 21^st century C.E.; whether they are members of a Brazilian indigenous Indian tribe or British aristocracy; whether they are Chinese, French or Pakistani. 

The justifications for universal moral rules are called ethical theories. There are two sets of ethical theories that head the long debate about right and wrong.  The first group of theories is consequentialist. The only thing that matters in evaluating an act as right and wrong are the consequences of the act. The consequences are either good or bad, depending on how these evaluative words are defined. The motives of the actor (e.g. jealousy) and the name of the act (e.g. a lie, a broken promise) are irrelevant to a determination of right or wrong.  

According to a version of the consequentialist theory called utilitarianism, a good consequence is identical with pleasure or happiness and a bad consequence is identical with pain or unhappiness. Thus, if I lie to you, my lie is justified if the total amount of pleasure is more than the total amount of pain.  The lie, in and of itself, apart from its consequences, is neither right nor wrong.  

“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.” (Utilitarianism).

The second set of major ethical theories are referred to as deontological. A version of deontologism is Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. This theory is a direct contradiction to utilitarianism and all other consequentialist ethical theories. The theory says that our moral obligations are absolute.  The imperative not to lie tells us categorically (unconditionally) that we must always tell the truth regardless of the consequences.  Here is one statement of Kant’s imperative:

 “So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in another, always as an end and never as only a means.”  (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals)

Thus, even if the consequences of telling a lie are good, to tell a lie is to treat the person to whom you tell the lie merely as a means to an end.  In effect, you are using that person to do something which that person has not consented to do.

Ethical theories are philosophical, not scientific. Scientific theories are tested by successful prediction of future events. Successful prediction is what justifies a scientific theory.  For example, discoveries about the construction and transmission of the deadly coronavirus made it possible to predict that the spread of COVID-19 disease in unvaccinated communities will be significantly greater than the spread in vaccinated communities.

Philosophical theories are not created to make predictions.  They are put forward to evaluate and guide human behavior.  If philosophy is conceptual analysis, then what justifies a philosophical belief is to be found only in an analysis of the concepts that comprise the belief.  This applies to beliefs about what is and what is not morally right or obligatory as much as it applies to any other philosophical belief.

A Simple Test to Determine Analytic Truth

There is a simple test to determine if this or any belief is analytically true.  It is called the closed question test.  It applies to questions about the relationship of concepts.  For example,  if it is analytically true that a bachelor is an unmarried male, then if someone were to ask “I know that John is a bachelor, but is he unmarried?” the answer is to be found in the question.  The first part of the sentence “John is a bachelor” answers the second part.  It makes no sense to ask the question in the first place unless the questioner is a young child or does not understand English.  The question is both closed and senseless.

If the question is open, the answer is not to be found in the question.  For example, if it is asked, “I know that John is a bachelor, but does John want to get married?” the first part of the sentence does not answer the second part.  Moreover, the question is not senseless.  The questioner can go outside the concept of ‘bachelor’ to determine what John wants or does not want.  But if someone proposes that wanting to get married is a defining part of the word ‘bachelor,’ then their definition is analytically false.  We know that it is false because one can sensibly ask the second part of the question (“does John want to get married?”). 

In general, when we have an analytically true belief, the question we construct from the belief is both senseless and closed.   When we have an analytically false belief, the question we construct from the belief is both sensible and open.

Let us apply this test to the two ethical theories described above, beginning with the utilitarian theory:  

The utilitarian principle states the belief (qua principle) that an act is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much good (happiness) as bad (misery). If it produces more misery than happiness, then the act is morally wrong.

The test question for the utilitarian is: “Is the act that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number the right thing to do?”

The question appears to be both sensible and open. If a defender of the utilitarian principle objects to this, there are several examples to which they can appeal.  For example, suppose the lives of two young children can be saved by killing one elderly person. Suppose it can also be shown that this would produce more happiness than letting the children die (the combined happiness of the two children over the many years to come is greater than the happiness of one elderly person who probably has only a few more years to live).  And yet despite this fact, it is reasonable to object that killing the elderly person without their consent is morally worse than saving the lives of the two children.

Because the test question is both sensible and open,  Mill’s utilitarian principle is analytically false.

We turn now to the test question for Kant’s categorical imperative: “Is an act that treats humanity as a means, whether in my own person or in the person of another, morally right?” 

Once again, as with the utilitarian principle, we find that the test question is both sensible and open.  The example that comes to mind is one that was familiar to Kant and his critics. Suppose that I am hiding a frightened person in my house because a deranged man who wants to kill him is going door to door hoping to find him.  He knocks on my door.  I open the door and he asks whether the person they seek is inside.  I reply by telling the lie “He is not in my house.”  The would-be killer leaves and I have saved the life of my frightened guest. 

This example proves that it is sensible to ask the question “Is it ever morally right to treat another person as a means to an end?”  And it is an open question, the answer to which can only be found by going outside the concepts contained in the question. 

Because the test question is both sensible and open, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, like Mill’s utility principle, is analytically false.

Keywords:  Utilitarianism study guide,Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals study guide,John Stuart Mill study guide,Immanuel Kant study guide Utility principle,Greatest Happiness principle,Categorical Imperative,ethical theory, theories of ethics,moral theory,philosophical theory,philosophy definition,open questions,closed questions

 

PHILOSOPHY NOTES Part 3 The Limits of Science

 

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Philosophy Notes    Part 3             

This is the third post  in the Philosophy Notes series.  Each post is a supplement to my philosophy study guides, designed to help beginning philosophy students read, understand, and think critically about the classic books of philosophy.   

Scientific Attempts to Prove the Existence of God

In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, David Hume spent most of the space in the book criticizing the then-popular Design Argument for the Existence of God, an argument based on a dubious analogy of natural to artificial things.  Although Hume was fully aware that the limits of philosophy are breached by the use of empirical analogies, he thought it important that he show how the argument fails, even when it is understood as an argument for proving a matter of fact (the existence of God).

Hume begins by pointing out that the Design Argument is analogical. If it is analogical, then it is inductive. If it is inductive then it gives probability not certainty to the conclusion. Arguments that give probability are a part of scientific not philosophical methodology.

The analogy promoted in the Design Argument is between natural things in the universe like animals and artificial (man-made) things like clocks and pianos. Both have “design,” meaning that natural things in the universe have parts that work together for “an end” in the same way that the parts of a clock work together to display the time of day. For example, the delicate parts of an animal’s eye work together to create sight. The chemical elements that compose the sun work together to create light. 

Because the animal and the eye “resemble exactly” artificial machines like clocks and pianos, the proponent of the design argument in Hume’s imagined dialogue refers to the eye and the sun as “natural machines.”  The resemblance is to be found in “the curious adapting of means to ends.” Here is how Hume has the character Cleanthes tell the remainder of the argument to his small audience (Philo and Demea): “Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to that of the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed.” (14).

By “the rules of analogy,” Hume means both the form and the content of analogical arguments.  Here is the form:

1. P is the cause of effects a, b and c.

2. Q is the cause of effects a, b and c.

3. P is the cause of effect d.

Therefore,

4. Q (probably) is the cause of effect d.

 In Hume’s words, the argument form is a posteriori (empirical), not a priori (analytic). The type of argument is inductive.  This means that the premises give probability (not certainty) to the conclusion.

 The inductive argument form is analogical.  In premise 1 and 2, an analogy or similarity of effects (a, b and c) have similar causes (P and Q). Premise 3 states an additional effect (d) of one of these causes (P). It is concluded (in 4)  that the other object or event (Q) probably is the cause of the same effect (d).

 Unlike the certainty of valid deductive arguments, the probability of inductive arguments comes in several degrees, beginning with low probability and ending with high probability.  For example, on the first day  of a college philosophy class, Pandorf notices that the book (P) she is holding (e.g. Plato’s Republic) has the same dust cover as the book (Q) Bengrit is holding.  Both dust covers are of the same color (a), have same title (b) and the same author’s name (c) imprinted on the cover. Pandorf knows that her book is Plato’s Republic (d) , not some other book. She infers from this resemblance that it is highly probable that removing the dust covers will reveal that Bengrit has the same book (d).

 If the premises of an analogical argument are to deliver high probability to the conclusion, then the premises must contain sufficient evidence to support that degree if probability.  If Pandorf sees Bengrit holding a large book with no dust cover, then she must adjust the degree of probability that Bengrit’s large book is the same as her dust covered book. Having only a large book in his hand is not sufficient evidence to conclude that it is “highly probable” that Bengrit is holding a copy of Plato’s Republic. The word “perhaps” is more suitable.

 And the evidence must be relevant.  If Bengrit is holding a hat or an ice cream cone, this has nothing to do with the conclusion.

 In his criticism of the Design Argument, Hume is aware of all of this, and more. The character Philo says that Cleanthes has given “a very weak analogy” because the similarity of the natural world to the artificial is “much less than exact.” (16). We know from experience that pianos and clocks are the product of intelligent design and construction.  We have no similar experience of intelligent design and construction of an animal eye, a head of cabbage or the universe itself.  We have no experience of an intelligent being planning and constructing a human eye, a head of cabbage or a universe.  About all that the proponent of the Design Argument has to go on is the weak analogy between the parts and interaction of the parts in both natural and artificial things.

 The fact that we have never experienced an intelligent designer put together a universe, a world, a cabbage or an animal eye does not mean that we have not experienced or experimented about the cause of each of these natural things.  For example, scientists have discovered that “three embryonic tissue sources—the neural ectoderm, the surface ectoderm, and the periocular mesenchyme—contribute to the formation of the mammalian eye.”[1] The authors of this article also write that “the developing eye has presented an invaluable system for studying the interactions among cells and, more recently, genes, in specifying cell fate.”

 The words “an invaluable system for studying the interactions among cells and genes” trigger an alarm for a response from the Design Argument proponents. They will say that a system with cell and gene interactions can only have been caused by an intelligent designer.

 But this response begs the question, “How do you know that such interactions can only hav been caused by an intelligent designer? Show us the evidence that supports this. If you can’t provide the evidence, then you are assuming the very thing that you want to prove!” 

 Philo make the point that because Cleanthes is a human being, he is biased about “thought,” “design” and “intelligence” over other kinds of causes.  But there are many more “springs” (causes) in the universe than these. In the 19^th century, known active causes at work in nature are “heat and cold, attraction and repulsion and a hundred others which fall under daily observation.” (19)  If I observe that water in my kettle is boiling, I will say that this is due to the high heat of the fire under the kettle.  If I set a magnet down next to my metal tweezers, and the tweezers slide toward the magnet, I say that magnet causes the tweezers to slide toward it. What I don’t say is “Thought and intelligence are the cause of these effects.”

 Of course, there are now more complex physical explanations of these phenomena, using different terminology. Scientists now use the words “thermal energy” to explain the change of “the state” of water from still to boiling.[2] The words now used for magnetic attraction is particle exchange, “a general feature of quantum field theory.”[3]

 I confess to knowing little about thermal energy and quantum field theory.  But my point is that if Philo (Hume) is right in saying that there are many different causes of events in nature, and the causal activity of thought and intelligence is only one of these, then without producing any empirical evidence at all, it is a fallacy to conclude that the origin of the universe, galaxies, stars, planets, human beings, trees and other plants are all the product of an intelligent designer. We might as well say that the universe “sprouted” from a seed or emerged (born) from the body of an animal.

 And if it is objected that the process of sprouting from a seed or emerging from an animal body could only have been planned and designed by an intelligent being, then this begs thequestion, “Of all the many causes of events that we know to exist in the universe, why should we choose intelligent design to explain the origin of the universe?”  

Have worlds ever been formed under your eye, and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory.(22)

Finally, it is important to remember that analogical arguments are inductive, proving probability of the conclusions, not certainty. As such, inductive arguments do not belong in the philosopher’s tool box.  Inductive arguments produce conclusions from empirical data. Scientists gather empirical data, make observations and do experiments.  Philosophers think about concepts and the conclusions they draw from their analyses are certain not probable.

The Limits of Science

Besides collecting sufficient relevant data to support a conclusion, the conclusion of inductive arguments must be falsifiable. This means that there must be a way or procedure that other scientists can use to show that the conclusion is false.  Suppose I experiment with a variety of face masks during a pandemic. I conclude that one of the masks gives better protection from the virus than all others I have tested.  My conclusion about “better protection” can be falsified.  Other scientists can run my experiment and show flaws in the collection of data that prove me wrong. 

                                                                                                                                                                                          But suppose someone says that God will punish those who wear face masks because  “God prohibits His people from covering their face.”  How would we prove that this claim is false?  What observations would a scientist make? What data would the scientist collect?  What science experiments can be performed to show that God does not exist and therefore, has made no such pronouncements? If there are no such relevant observations, data or experiments, then it is safe to say that the dictum “God prohibits His people from covering their face” cannot be falsified.  As such, we can safely declare it to be “nonsense.”

I will leave readers with this question: Can the claim that the universe was created by an intelligent designer be falsified?

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Learn more about David Hume’s critique of the ontological and design arguments in Laurence Houlgate’s Understanding David Hume: The Smart Student’s Guide to Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the Essays on Miracles, Immortality at https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07RN9HQHS

Do you need help reading and understanding philosophy?  Get a free copy of Understanding Philosophy: The Smart Students Guide to Reading and Writing Philosophy at www.HoulgateBooks.com

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[1] Heavner, W., & Pevny, L. (2012). Eye development and retinogenesis. Cold Spring Harbor perspectives in biology, 4(12), a008391. https://doi.org/10.1101/cshperspect.a008391

[2] “Physical conditions like temperature and pressure affect state of matter. ... When thermal energy is added to a substance, its temperature increases, which can change its state from solid to liquid (melting), liquid to gas (vaporization), or solid to gas (sublimation).” https://www.legendsoflearning.com/learning-objectives/effects-of-temperature-and-pressure-on-state/

[3] Tavora, Michael. https://towardsdatascience.com/gravity-and-electric-charges-attraction-and-repulsion-b2b5f8f91caa