A Conversation Between John Stuart Mill and John Locke on Natural Rights

John Locke

John Stuart Mill

An imaginary conversation between J.S. Mill and John Locke on the idea of natural rights

The scene: a pub somewhere in central London

Locke: Good evening Mill, I just read Utilitarianism, and was surprised and disappointed to find that you make no mention of natural rights.  As you know, natural rights are a staple of liberal political philosophy and I wrote extensively about this in Second Treatise of Government.

Mill: Yes, I read your book many times, but each time I asked myself the question "What is a natural right?" It is the word 'natural' that bothers me. I assume that you mean 'not artificial' or 'not man-made'?

L:   You are getting close.  The way I conceive it is that a natural right is a right that a person has in the state of nature, as determined by the law of nature.

M: Now I am even more confused.  What is the state of nature?  Is it a place where people live?

L:  The words “state of nature” do not specify a place.  They specify a type of relationship between two or more persons.  It is a pre-political relationship in which there is no authorized third-party or umpire to whom people can turn to settle disputes about what laws exist or whether a law has been violated.

M: So, if there is a dispute about what rights are valid, there is no way to decide this?

L: Now I get to ask you a question. What do you mean by a valid right?

M: A valid right is a claim on society to protect the alleged right-holder from harm, by either the force of law or by education and opinion.  For example, you and I have a right to life because a claim to have our life protected by the force of law is guaranteed by civil society.  On the other hand, we do not have a right to be given a new horse and buggy every year because any such claim is not guaranteed by society.

L:  So, based on your account of validity, there are no valid rights in the state of nature.  There is no mechanism for making a “claim on civil society,” because by definition, there is no civil society.  If anyone insists that what another person has done violates the law of nature, he is on his own.  Most people in a state of nature are ignorant of the natural law anyway, and even if you think you know the law, there is no one they can call on for validation or for enforcement. 
 

M: If there is no way to prove (validate) that something does or does not belong to a person “by right” in the state of nature, then your idea of a natural right seems to me to be so much empty noise.  What would be the point of going around announcing that you have a right to life if you have no claim on others to protect you in the possession of it?  As my godfather Jeremy Bentham once said, the idea of a natural right is “nonsense upon stilts.”

L: That assessment is a bit harsh.  The natural rights to life, liberty, health and possessions can still serve a purpose as an ideal set of rights that a society ought to adopt as positive law.  

M: I agree that these rights ought to be legally enacted, but if you ask me why I agree, I can give no other reason than general utility.

L:  Oh!  I was going to say that they ought to be adopted because they are natural rights.

M:  Isn’t that what you said when we started this conversation?    

[For more on J.S. Mill's theory of rights, read chapter V of Utilitarianism.  See also Understanding John Stuart Mill: The Smart Student's Guide to Utilitarianism and On Liberty .  This link takes you to my website.  Below the free book offer you will find the book cover image. Click on that to get to the Amazon detail page.]