Monday, February 27, 2023

HAVE YOU EVER CRIED AT THE MOVIES?

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Why Are We Moved by Fictitious Tragedies?

 

Suppose that my wife, after she and I saw Romeo and Juliet die in the final scene of Shakespeare's play, said: "Larry, are you crying? It's a play, for God's sake. No real people died. Don't be so irrational."

 

Is belief in the existence of an event (e.g. a real death) a necessary condition for being emotionally moved by it? If it is, then why are some people emotionally moved by the fictitious death of a character in a play, movie, or novel? Are these emotions irrational? If belief in the existence of an event is not a necessary condition for being moved by what we see on the stage, then how are we to distinguish between being emotionally moved by a real death and being moved by a fictitious death?

 

Why did I cry when I saw Romeo and Juliet die even though I knew full well that what I was witnessing was not real? Was the feeling that made me tear-up irrational?

 

In Part I of the journal article, "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" Colin Redford gives several answers to my question but admits that none of them seem to work. For example, while watching the death scene, I might tell my wife that I cried because momentarily I forgot that I was watching a stage play.

 

But this seems wrong. If I really did forget, why didn't I  jump out of my seat, dash onto the stage and try to convince Romeo that Juliet is not dead?

 

Another solution proposed by Redford is to point out that many people are not moved at all by the behavior of fictional characters.

 

But this answer won't help because many people (including me) are moved by tragic scenes in books, plays, or movies.

 

Redford's final solution is to distinguish between the meaning of "moved by" when witnessing a real tragedy and the meaning of "moved by" when witnessing a fictitious tragedy. The difference is that in the latter case having a belief that what one sees is real is not a necessary condition for being moved by what one sees. Hence, there is no inconsistency here that requires explanation.

 

But Redford also objects to this solution because it leaves us asking why the second meaning of "moved by" does not require a belief that what you are witnessing is real.

 

This is where Michael Westin steps in. Although he does not mention it, his solution is actually the explanation that Redford was looking for. 

 

In part II Westin says that our responses to fictional characters are essentially responses to works of art. The object that moves us when watching a play is not the death of one or two characters, but how the characters appear in the thematic structure of the play. We respond to the death of Romeo and Juliet as a response to the meaning of the play of which their death in the last scene is a part. 

 

Saying the words "Romeo and Juliet are dead" to the person sitting next to you in the auditorium makes sense only if you are attending the play. And if you say, at the conclusion of the play, "I wish that they hadn't died," then either you have been watching a different play or the characters would not be Romeo and Juliet.

 

Do you want to learn more about this debate? Go to:

How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?

Authors: Colin Radford and Michael Weston

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes , 1975, Vol. 49

(1975), pp. 67-93

Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Aristotelian Society

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106870

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